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The decentralised nature of Regulation 1/2003 meant that all Member States of the EU have an 
obligation to enforce EU competition law in addition to their domestic equivalent once the 
criterion of ‘the Effect on Interstate Trade between the Member States’ is triggered. While 
larger Member States are better equipped to deal with supranational cases, smaller Member 
States in terms of their limited resources and lack of experience may struggle. Unfortunately, the 
academic literature on small countries in the EU is scarce and fragmented. Filing the gap in the 
literature, this paper will argue that ‘smallness’ in competition law does matter, as small Member 
States are more exposed to the enforcement of the EU competition provisions. Given the 
obligation imposed by Regulation 1/2003, the paper will further explore the challenges faced by 
the National Competition Authorities (the NCAs) of small Member States from the post-2004 
accession, namely Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia in 
their enforcement of EU competition law.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The decentralised nature of Regulation 1/2003 meant that all Member States of the EU 
have an obligation to enforce EU competition law in addition to their domestic 
equivalent once the criterion of ‘the Effect on Interstate Trade between the Member 
States’ is triggered. This in practical terms insinuated that most EU competition cases 
are decided by at least 28 NCAs with the European Commission focusing on larger 
pan-European cases.1 For instance, from 1 May 2004 until 31 December 2012 
approximately 88% of all decisions on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were adopted at 
national level.2 
While the National Competition Authorities have some leverage in the enforcement of 
their national law, especially in the context of unilateral conduct and merger control, 
the same cannot be said about Article 101 TFEU. It is important that the EU 
competition rules are applied and enforced uniformly across Member States to ensure a 
fair playing field. While larger Member States are better equipped to deal with 
supranational cases, smaller Member States in terms of their limited resources and lack 
                                                                                                                                         
*  Senior Lecturer in Law, Brunel University London. Any comments are gratefully welcome at 
jurgita.malinauskaite@brunel.ac.uk. The paper was presented at the CLaSF Workshop “Competition Law 
Public Enforcement Across the EU”, LUMSA Law School, Rome, 10 September 2015. This article is 
dedicated to the memory of Brian Tinsley. 
1  See, the statistics provided by the ECN, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html 
(accessed on 20 October 2015).  
2  See W. Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003- a Retrospective’, presentation at the conference 10 Years of 
Regulation 1/2003, Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, 7 June 2013. 
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of experience may struggle. Unfortunately, the academic literature on small countries in 
the EU is scarce and fragmented. Filing the gap in the literature, this paper will argue 
that ‘smallness’ in competition law does matter, as small Member States are more 
exposed to the obligation of enforcement of EU competition provisions. This is 
because there are several industries where scale economies exceed the demand of a 
small country. Equally, the current approach employed by the European Commission 
and the Courts with regard to the broadly interpreted element of ‘effect on trade 
between Member States’ implies that this aspect should be easily met in small Member 
States due to their integrated national markets  and therefore, the EU competition law 
provisions should be applied instead (or simultaneously) of national law. Logically, the 
application of national law should be fading away. Yet, this is not the case in some 
small Member States.  Building on the ECN statistics,3 the article reveals that there are 
a lower number of cases where Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were directly enforced in 
some small Member States during the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 March 2015. 
While making further distinction between ‘older’, as the pre-2004 accession Member 
States and ‘newer’ referred to the post-2004 accession Member States due to their lack 
of experience in enforcing competition law and limited resources, the paper selects the 
following post-2004 wave countries, such as Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia. Given the implications of Regulation 1/2003, the paper 
will explore the challenges faced by the National Competition Authorities (the NCAs) 
of these small ‘newer’ Member States in their enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. The scope of this article will shy away from any specific investigative or 
decision making powers. Instead, the paper will canvass the NCAs’ capacity of these 
selected small ‘newer’ Member States to enforce EU competition law followed with in-
depth analysis being placed on the Member States with the lowest degree of 
enforcement. 
Particularly, the paper, first of all, will define small countries and their specific features 
in the context of this article (Section II). Regulation 1/2003 and its impact on the 
NCAs especially, in the analysed countries will be evaluated by employing a SWOT 
analysis in order to discover the extent to which the decentralisation has presented the 
NCAs with new opportunities as well as obligations (Section III). Section IV will 
overview the extent to which ‘smallness’ matters in competition law and its 
enforcement. Besides the generic part, the following sections will then place emphasis 
explicitly on the NCAs of small ‘newer’ Member States and their enforcement. Notably, 
Section V will discuss the NCAs of these countries and their independence, whereas 
their policies in place to overcome their limited resources, namely via the creation of 
‘multi-functional’ agencies and the introduction of prioritisation policies will be 
analysed in Section VI.  Finally, enforcement experience of the EU competition 
provisions and challenges faced by these small ‘newer’ Member States will be elaborated 
in Section VII with the concluding remarks being distilled in Section VIII. 
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II. SMALL ‘NEWER’ EU MEMBER STATES: DEFINITION AND SPECIFIC 
FEATURES 
(i). How small is ‘small’? 
There is no universal definition of small countries. Size is a relative concept that should 
be placed in a certain context. Traditionally, three highly correlated indicators, such as a 
population size, territory and GDP are used to define ‘small’. In the literature, small 
states are often deﬁned by population thresholds, which vary largely from 1.5 million 
like the Commonwealth Secretariat’s definition,4 to 5-10 million in the United Nations 
projects5 or even between 10 to 15 million.6 Quite often economies in transition are 
also embraced to a category of small market economies, as a concentration in the 
economic context is on the ability of small-state economies to survive in a world where 
economies of scale still dominate. 
Given the EU’s proportionate representation and smallness as ‘a comparative and not 
absolute idea’,7 for the purpose of this paper the following matrices have been 
employed to categorise and classify the Member States in the EU. Firstly, the paper 
focuses on countries with a population up to 5 million (or just above 5 million) which 
in the context of total EU population is about 1.1%. Secondly, the paper also sets an 
economic criterion of GDP below €75.5 billion.8 Thirdly, the emphasis of this paper is 
solely on the post-2004 accession Member States (also referred to as ‘newer’ Member 
States in this article). This is because they are less experienced in the enforcement of 
competition law. Additionally, the GDP and the budget of the NCAs of these countries 
are significantly lower in comparison with the pre-2004 accession member states. For 
instance, Malta’s GDP is €7.99 billion whereas Luxembourg’s GDP is € 49.4 billion – 
                                                                                                                                         
4  For instance, some World Bank projects in their work on small states used a threshold of 1.5 million people 
and in some instances, larger states, such as Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua New Guinea, are 
included because of their lack of institutional capabilities. See, for instance, World Bank, ‘Small States: 
Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy’, Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint 
Taskforce, April 2000, available online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/ 
meetingchallengeinglobaleconomyl.pdf; also see World Bank, ‘Deﬁning a Small Economy’, Projects and 
Operations, 2007, available online at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/ 
0,,contentMDK:21512464~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html (accessed on 25 April 
2016).  
5  For instance, in the United Nations in 1992 created informal group called the Forum of Small States (FOSS) 
served as a platform for small states with a population of 10 million or below. B. Thorhallsson ‘Small States 
in the UN Security Council: Means of Inﬂuence?’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160. 
6  For instance, S. Kuznets in ‘Economic Growth of Small Nations’ used an upper limit of 10 million of the 
population to define a small country. S. Kuznets ‘Economic Growth of Small Nations’ in E.A.G. Robinson 
(ed.) Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, Macmillan, 1960. Harvey W. Armstrong and Robert Read, 
‘The Phantom of Liberty? Economic Growth and the Vulnerability of Small States’, Journal of International 
Development, vol. 14, no. 4, 2002, pp. 435-458. 
7  The United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR 1971, at 29. 
8  There has been no special significance in the selection of particular population or GDP thresholds to define 
small countries in this paper. Yet, a decision was made to include Slovakia due to the fact that there is a 
rather large gap between Slovakia and the next biggest newer Member State – Bulgaria with a population of 
over 7 million. 
9  See Table 1. 
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each making up 0.1% of total EU population. Similarly, Denmark and Slovakia each 
comprise 1.1% of total EU population, but their GDP vary drastically, where the 
former has € 257.4 billion GDP and the latter €75.2 billion.10 Therefore, the following 
countries were identified that met the set criteria: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia.11  
Table 1. Post-2004 accession small Member States  
Country Population (2014)/ mil 
EU population 
(2014)/ % 
Territory 
(2014)/ km2 
GDP 
(billion)(2014) 
Croatia 4.2  0.8 56 594  € 43.085 
Cyprus 0.86  0.2 9 251  € 17.506  
Estonia 1.3  0.3  45 227  € 19.525  
Latvia 2  0.4  64 573  € 24.060 
Lithuania 2.94  0.6  65 300  € 36.309 
Malta 0.425  0.1  316  € 7.912 
Slovakia 5.4  1.1  49 035  € 75.215 
Slovenia 2  0.4  20 273  € 37.246 
(sources: http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ & http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/ 
index_en.htm) 
(ii). Specific features of small ‘newer’ Member States 
There are specific features attributable to small ‘newer’ Member States. In contrast to 
‘older’ Member States, where competition law has been embedded for some time, the 
‘newer’ Member States lack expertise in enforcing the economic principles 
underpinning competition law, and they also lack credibility in the eyes of the other 
State institutions, public opinion, and the business community. The NCAs of all 
analysed countries also suffer from limited resources.12 The European Commission in 
its report13 identified that the NCAs of several Member States, including Latvia, Malta, 
and Slovenia suffer from low personnel levels and limited financial resources. It seems 
that the NCA of these small ‘newer’ countries are stuck in a loop. On the one hand, 
they have limited resources due to their smallness and development level of their 
economies. Yet, the NCAs of these ‘newer’ Member States are required to allocate extra 
resources on disseminating information about competition law and on instilling a 
                                                                                                                                         
10  See Table 1. 
11  Further grouping is possible of these identified Member States: a) micro island countries, such as Cyprus 
and Malta with a population below 900,000 and geographical isolation; and b) the remaining countries - 
former post-communist countries with initially barely any understanding of the principles of market 
economies. However, the article does not specifically follow this narrow categorisation.  
12  Note: further discussion will be provided in Section VI. 
13  See, Commission Staff Working Document ‘Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States' 
competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues’, Accompanying the document, Communication 
From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives SWD(2014) 231/2, at p 13. 
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competition culture in the business community.14 First of all, it has been necessary to 
change the mind-set of undertakings, public authorities and consumers to explain the 
benefits of competition in these countries. For instance, the Competition Council of 
Lithuania regularly publishes the quantified direct and indirect benefits of competition 
enforcement to consumers.15 Secondly, the NCAs of these countries are expected to 
prove to their governments that they provide value for money in securing the budgets 
necessary for their functioning and operation. For instance, some of the NCAs of small 
countries, namely, Croatia identify securing sufficient budget to enhance efficiency in 
the work of the Croatian Competition Agency as a top priority.16 Building an 
impeccable reputation of the NCAs does not happen overnight. Consequently, due to 
the specific peculiarities attributable to these small ‘newer’ Member States, they are 
distinguishable from the other Member States and should be analysed separately. 
There are other specific features usually attached to small countries; they are 
concentrated markets and the inability to exploit economies of scale. Therefore, small 
countries have a greater stake for openness to trade and maintaining free trade in order 
to increase the size of their markets.17 Admittedly, all these ‘newer’ Member States were 
eager to join the Internal Market with over 500 million consumers and took steps 
towards integration even before officially joining the EU via signing the Association 
Agreements. They all had to establish a functioning market economy with its ability to 
sustain the competitive pressure from and in the then Single Market and the Economic 
and Monetary Union, which was one of the pre-accession conditions. On the one hand, 
the removal of barriers to trade has enabled businesses in these countries to realise 
economies of scale, especially through expansion into their neighbouring markets. In 
practice this works if companies are capable and willing to exploit these lucrative 
opportunities.18 While penetrating well developed Western markets have been difficult 
for these small businesses, there have been more successes with their neighbours due to 
                                                                                                                                         
14  For instance, in early days much of the NCAs resources in these countries were spent on disseminating 
information about competition law. Many businessmen at the time considered it to be unfair that other 
traders are entering their markets and taking their businesses that they had exclusively enjoyed for many 
years. See, for instance, Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Roundtable on: Prioritization and resource 
allocation as a tool for agency effectiveness, Contribution by Malta, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013. Similar approach was in 
the Baltic countries, See J. Malinauskaite, Merger control in post-communist countries, Routledge, 2010. 
15  The Competition Council of Lithuania, ‘Evaluating Work of the Competition Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania: Direct and Indirect Benefits to Consumers’, 2011 and then 2013. Available at: 
kt.gov.lt/en/info/doc/news_2013-04-10.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2015). 
16  See, M.Liszt, ‘Croatia: Overview’, the European Antitrust Review 2016, Global Competition Review. Available 
at: http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/72/sections/243/chapters/2907/croatia-overview/ 
(accessed on 15 September 2015). 
17  A.Alesina, E.Spolaoze, R.Waeziarg, ‘Trade, Growth and the Size of Countries’, in P.Aghion and S.N.Durlauf 
(eds) Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol 1B, Elsevier, 2005, Chapter 23. 
18  Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses in these countries have limited access to capital allowing them 
to expand into foreign markets. Nevertheless, it seems that the Commission’s Capital Markets Union aims 
to facilitate Member States with the smallest markets to have a better channelling of capital and investment 
into their projects. See, Press Release, ‘Capital Markets Union: an Action Plan to boost business funding and 
investment financing’, 30 September 2015, IP/15/5731. 
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geographical and cultural proximity.  For instance, for Slovak firms the most frequent 
foreign markets are Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.19  
On the other hand, the situation has reverse effects: national businesses which were 
protected from foreign competition, now have to compete with foreign undertakings in 
their home markets. The Central and Eastern European countries20 have been an 
important destination for the Union undertakings wishing to expand their businesses to 
lower-cost locations and utilise skilled local work-forces.21 For instance, the Central and 
Eastern European region in 2013 was the fourth in the world by both the value and 
number of executed mergers and acquisitions transactions.22 These countries, especially 
Eastern European countries are also politically motivated to be part of a deeper 
European integration and to shatter any previous links with the former Soviet Union, 
especially in the context of the Energy market.23 Most recent development involves 
reaching an agreement in October 2015 to facilitate the integration of the gas systems 
of the Baltic Sea region into the internal EU gas markets in line with the European 
Commission’s energy security strategy to ensure that no region in Europe remains 
isolated.24  
Furthermore, the euro is the most tangible proof of advanced European integration. 
For instance, price dispersion (i.e. another indicator of economic integration) is much 
less pronounced in the Euro area than in the EU as a whole.25 All the countries 
analysed in this paper (save Croatia, which has not met the necessary conditions and it 
                                                                                                                                         
19  V.Kaputa, H.Palus, R.Vlosky, ‘Barriers for wood processing companies to enter foreign markets: a case 
study in Slovakia’, (2016) 74 European Journal of Wood and Wood Products 109–122. 
20  This article employs an OECD term to define Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which 
comprise of the group of countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
21  A.Mayhew, Recreating Europe: the European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, 
Cambridge University press, 1998, at 191 
22  Zephyr Annual M&A Report. Global (2013). Available at: www.mandaportal.com/getattachment/8ff3c7f7-
7179-45a4-8109-2246d640ddac/Global,-FY-2013 (accessed on 20 April 2016). Apart from M&As, there are 
other indicators to establish market integration, such as FDI, price index and regulatory data. See, for 
instance, F.A.Ilzkovitz, et al., ‘Steps towards a deeper economic integration: the Internal Market in the 21st 
century a contribution to the Single Market Review’, European Economy, European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, N° 271 January 2007. There is also the EU-25-
Index, which determines the individual degree of European integration for each member state of the then 
EU-25 countries on an annual basis since the enlargement in 2004 based on EU Single Market, EU 
Homogeneity, EU Symmetry and EU Conformity. Available at: http://www.eu-index.uni-
goettingen.de/?lang=en (accessed 30 April 2016).  
23  For example, in the Gazprom case the Commission’s preliminary investigation suggests that Gazprom is 
hindering competition in the gas supply markets in eight Member States (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia), the Statement of Objections were sent to Gazprom on 22 
April 2015. 
24  The European Commission, Press release, ‘End of energy isolation in the Baltics: how the Gas 
Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) works’, Brussels, 15 October 2015, MEMO/15/5845. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5845_en.htm (accessed 25 April 2016). 
25  Eurostat, Comparative price levels for food, beverages and tobacco, 2012. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Comparative_price_levels_for_food,_ 
beverages_and_tobacco (accessed 25 April 2016). 
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is not yet qualified) are part of the Eurozone. Lithuania is the newest country to join 
the euro in January 2015.  
Given that economic integration is a continuum, which varies across different areas (i.e. 
finance, goods, and services) and over time, this article does not attempt to capture the 
extent to which national markets of these small ‘newer’ Member States are integrated 
into the Internal Market. Instead, it makes an assumption that most businesses overstep 
or will be overstepping national borders in the near future. 
III. REGULATION 1/2003 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NCAS OF SMALL ‘NEWER’ 
MEMBER STATES 
1 May 2004 marked a major development of EU competition law with Regulation 
1/2003 coming into force26 and ten new Member States joining the enforcement club 
with barely any knowledge and experience of market principles. Regulation 1/2003 
eradicated an obsolete notification system and established the premises for a more 
decentralised application of Union competition rules by the NCAs and national courts 
in addition to the European Commission. The NCAs and national courts, including the 
newly joined Member States have become key pillars of the application of EU 
competition law, where Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003 has provided not only the 
possibility but also imposed an obligation on the NCAs of the Member States to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in parallel with their national competition rules when the 
effect on trade criterion is met. They are obliged to do so whenever trade between 
Member States is affected in accordance with the procedures set in place by Regulation 
1/2003. 
This section will explore the underlining basis of Regulation 1/2003 and its impact on 
the ‘newer’ Member States of small countries, using a SWOT analysis. The SWOT is a 
useful technique widely used in various mainly business related projects to understand 
the Strengths, Weaknesses, and identify the Opportunities and potential Threats 
faced.27 Regulation 1/2003 is discussed in the broader context embracing its supporting 
documents.28  
                                                                                                                                         
26  Note: Regulation 139/2004 also came into force on 1 May 2004. However, this paper excludes merger 
control. 
27  These will be looked at from the NCAs’ perspective only. The impact on the European Commission will be 
excluded. 
28  They are Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ L 123 of 27.4.2004, pages 18-24; 
Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, 
pages 43-53; Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU 
Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pages 54-64; Commission 
Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ C 
101 of 27.4.2004, pages 65-77; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions 
concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) OJ C 101 of 
27.4.2004, pages 78-80; Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pages 81-96; Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ 
C 101 of 27.4.2004, pages 97-118.  
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As far as the Strengths of Regulation 1/2003 are concerned, it widened the competence 
of the NCAs and national courts. All the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are 
now capable of producing direct effect which is in line with the principle of subsidiarity 
bringing a decision to the authority with the best knowledge of national markets. It has 
also led to broader enforcement scope of EU competition rules. For instance, most EU 
competition cases are decided by the NCAs with the European Commission focusing 
on larger pan-European cases.29  Indeed, from 1 May 2004 until 31 December 2012 
approximately 88% of all decisions on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were adopted at 
national level.30 The NCAs of ‘newer’ Member States have also become full members 
of the ECN (the European Competition Network), which was created as a vehicle for 
the European Commission and the NCAs close co-operation. It has also initiated 
further co-operation among NCAs, especially with those in the neighbouring markets, 
for instance, Cyprus and Greece,31 Slovenia, Austria and Hungary,32 Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania.33 Along similar lines, Regulation 1/2003 has opened several 
opportunities for NCAs. First of all, the NCAs are directly involved in the EU 
competition law enforcement with regular contacts and consultation on enforcement 
policy with the European Commission enabling the NCAs, especially from ‘newer’ 
Member States to better understand the EU framework and policies to ensure their 
effective and consistent application. Secondly, Regulation 1/2003 and specifically, the 
ECN, has created a forum for the NCAs to pool their experience and identify best 
practices on particular issues which could provide guidance to NCAs with regard to 
their enforcement activities or to their national parliaments for reforming respective 
legislation.34 Therefore, it can serve as an instrument to promote the convergence of 
national procedures and sanctions with Regulation 1/2003.  
However, “all that glitters is not gold”,35 therefore, the Weaknesses of Regulation 
1/2003 cannot be ignored. Firstly, Regulation 1/2003 directly intervened in the 
domestic enforcement of competition law. This meant that these Member States had to 
undertake further reforms in order to accommodate the changes brought by Regulation 
                                                                                                                                         
29  See, the statistics provided by the ECN, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html 
(accessed on 20 October 2015).  
30  See W. Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003- a Retrospective’, presentation at the conference 10 Years of 
Regulation 1/2003, Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, 7 June 2013. 
31  See, the Prioritisation policy proposed by the Commission for the Protection of Competition in Cyprus. 
32  See, for example, a recent conference “Slovenian competition day” organised by the Slovenian Competition 
Protection Agency on 17 September 2015 with the aim to bring together competition law experts from 
European Commission, Competition Authorities from Austria, Hungary and Slovenia as well as 
representatives of Courts, private sector and academics. 
33  See, for instance, the annual meeting of the representatives from the Baltic and Finnish Competition 
Authorities – Regional Competition Conference, hosted by the Estonian Competition Authority on 4-5 June 
2013. The meeting was designed to focus on actual competition concerns, exchange information about 
developments and jointly find solutions. On the second day of the conference discussions between case- 
handlers took place in sectoral working groups. See, ECA, Annual report 2013. 
34  M.Kekelekis, ‘The European Commission Network (ECN): It Does Actually Work Well’, EIPASCOPE 
2009(1), the study report undertaken by EIPA with the self-assessment of NCAs on the functioning of their 
own organisations and of the ECN. 
35  Shakespeare, from the Merchant of Venice.  
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1/2003. A failure on the part of a Member State to fulfil its obligations under EU law, 
would mean that the European Commission may launch formal infringement 
procedures pursuant to Article 258 TFEU. For instance, the European Commission 
initiated proceedings against Cyprus, where the NCA of Cyprus lacked the power to 
apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, because national law made no provision to this 
effect.36 A warning was issued against Slovakia due to the limited ability of the NCA to 
apply either national rules or Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the telecommunication 
sector.37 Therefore, Regulation 1/2003 has reduced the scope for national policy 
choices. Secondly, Regulation 1/2003 has also increased the workload on the NCAs 
with the implementation and enforcement of EU competition law and policy frequently 
requiring significant human and budgetary resources; it was often more than these 
countries could afford. This is because these NCAs also need to have the same basic 
equipment as NCAs in larger Member States in order to be able to effectively enforce 
the competition rules. For instance, initially the Competition Protection Office of 
Slovenia started working with only 4 employees and with a minimum budget. It seems 
that the European Commission is unwilling to take into account the limited resources 
of these Member States and once the NCA starts an investigation under Article 13 
Regulation 1/2003, it will not release the NCA from its task.38 This hands-off approach 
may not be sufficient to ensure the functioning of the decentralisation system39 and this 
in turn may lead to another weakness, such as a failure to secure a uniform application 
of EU competition law and to promote legal certainty. This is especially important in 
the context of Article 102 TFEU, where the Member States are free to have stricter 
national rules. Given that there is also a need to converge some national enforcement 
rules in line with the EU, this places extra costs on national Member States. For 
instance, there are several legal obligations stemming from Regulation 1/2003, namely 
the obligation for the NCAs and national courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
and the convergence rule for Article 101 TFEU pursuant to Article 3 and the obligation 
to set up the NCAs with a defined list of the powers enabling them to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.40 Furthermore, currently all Member States are under an obligation 
to implement the Directive on Antitrust Damages Action.41 Even though there was no 
such obligation, the ECN members endorsed a Model Leniency Programme42 and 
Recommendation on the power to set priorities43 and committed to use their best 
                                                                                                                                         
36  See Case Lumiere TV Public Company Ltd./Multichoice (national file reference 11.17.14/2006). 
37  See the Commission press Release IP/09/200 of 02.02.2009. 
38  Case T-201/11 Si.mobil telekomunikacijske storitve d.d. v European Commission, [2014]. Further discussion will be 
provided in Section IV.  
39  A more frequent use of Article 11 (6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
40  Articles 35 and 5 Regulation 1/2003. 
41  Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19  
42  The ECN Model Leniency Programme, introduced in 2006, has been a major catalyst in encouraging ECN 
members to introduce leniency programmes and in promoting convergence between them. It was revised in 
2012. 
43  ECN Recommendation on the Power to Set Priorities, December 2013. 
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efforts to align their national programmes to these recommendations. The European 
Commission’s most recent call for public consultations on ‘Empowering the National 
Competition Authorities to be more effective Enforcers’ suggests that potentially 
further steps will have to be taken in order to facilitate even further convergence.44 
Finally, the NCAs have encountered additional costs due to the extra workload in the 
context of assisting in the investigation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to the European 
Commission and other NCAs. 
Finally, as far as the Threats are concerned, the research undertaken by Botta, 
Svetilicinii and Bernatt prove that the NCAs of ‘newer’ Member States, including small 
countries, largely rely on their domestic equivalents instead of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.45 Therefore, this points to under-enforcement of the EU competition law 
provisions.46 Undertakings of these countries may turn to neighbouring countries if 
they wish for the EU competition law provisions to be enforced, leading to the risk of 
forum shopping. Other potential threats, such as parallel proceedings are currently 
unlikely to take place in these countries.47  
IV. ‘SMALLNESS IN COMPETITION LAW’ – DOES IT REALLY MATTER? 
While the previous sections identified the specific features of small ‘newer’ Member 
States of the EU and obligations imposed by the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, 
this section will further elaborate on whether these features play any role in the context 
of the application and enforcement of competition law. At the outset, it is useful to 
recap the limited debates on the application of competition law in small EU Member 
States,48 which mainly centred on the definition of relevant markets, especially in the 
context of merger control. 
Following several merger blockages by the European Commission,49 the Nordic 
countries sparked fierce debates in late 1990s that the methods adopted by the 
European Commission in defining geographic markets could lead to discrimination 
                                                                                                                                         
44  The European Commission’s call for public consultations on ‘Empowering the National Competition 
Authorities to be more effective Enforcers’; the consultation period was from 4 November 2015 to 12 
February 2016. 
45  M. Botta, A. Svetlicinii, M. Bernatt, ‘The assessment of the effect on trade by the national competition 
authorities of the “new” Member States: Another legal partition of the Internal Market?’ (2015) 52(5) 
Common Market Law Review 1247–1275. 
46  Especially so, if the NCAs of smaller Member States rely on the neighbouring NCAs to initiate proceedings. 
47  For further discussion on the impact of Regulation 1/2003 in New Member States, see KJ. Cseres, ‘The 
Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States’ (2010) 6(2) Competition Law Review 145-182. 
48  On international level, it seems that ‘smallness’ has attracted more attention. See, for instance, The ICN 
studies Special Project for the 8th Annual Conference, Competition Law in Small Economies, Prepared by 
Swiss Competition Commission Israel Antitrust Authority, 2009. There has been contrasting opinions 
expressed. On the one hand, it has been suggested that the size of the economy has a limited significance in 
the context of competition law and, instead, relates to the functioning of competition in the domestic 
market. On the other hand, it has been indicated that the size of the economy should be taken into account 
up to a certain extent and that the competition rules and their application could be adjusted to peculiarities 
of a small free market economy. 
49  See, for instance, the Volvo/Scania merger case No. COMP/M. 1672 or SCA/Metsa Tissue Case No. IV/M. 
2097. 
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towards small Member States. The allegations were placed on the European 
Commission due to its approach to prevent undertakings in small countries to merge 
because they would quickly reach dominance in the national concentrated markets (i.e. 
concentrated markets are one of the features of small market economies), ignoring the 
fact that they need to grow in order to compete worldwide.50 This criticism was 
rejected by the European Commission as flawed, sending a clear message that there is:  
“no reason to modify competition laws or their application according to the size of 
the relevant geographic market, and consider[s] as counterproductive and 
dangerous arguments that competition laws should be diluted or [misapplied] in 
order to allow ‘national champions’ to develop, regardless of the size of the 
jurisdiction or market.”51  
Therefore, all Member States, regardless of their size or development level, have an 
obligation to apply EU competition law uniformly to secure a fair playing field for 
undertakings.  
In contrast, a pioneering piece of work by Professor Gal on competition law in small 
market economies supports a theory that small market economies52 require different 
competition rules; this is because in small markets there are a limited number of market 
players and markets can serve only a limited number of players, as a result only a 
limited number of firms can act effectively in the market. Gal further argues that small 
size affects competition law from its goals to its rules of thumb and that the countries 
of small market economies have to tailor their competition law in accordance to their 
small size. Even though this article excludes substantive issues with regard to the 
application of the EU competition law provisions, Gal’s defined notion of ‘smallness’ 
supports further arguments. According to Gal, conventional ‘size’ factors, such as 
population size are less important. Instead, the focus should be placed on some key 
elements, such as openness to trade and high concentration levels. Consequently, 
countries, such as Latvia would not be regarded as ‘small’ due to their openness to 
trade.53 Thus, building on Gal’s theory it can be argued that national relevant markets in 
the context of small countries should be evaporating and becoming more integrated in 
larger neighbouring markets or into the whole of the EU internal market.54 This is 
because there are numerous industries where scale economies exceed the demand of a 
                                                                                                                                         
50  The Nordic countries further expressed that in large Member States such a problem would not arise because 
undertakings could reach the necessary dimension without approaching the level of dominance. 
51  SPEECH/01/439, Speech by Commissioner Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition 
Policy, ‘Market definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy’ Workshop on Market Definition - 
Helsinki Fair Centre Helsinki, 5 October 2001. 
52  Gal, M.S., Competition policy for small market economies, New York: Harvard University press, 2003. Specifically, 
Professor Gal in her book provides three main factors in delineating the characteristics of small market 
economies, which are population size, population dispersion and openness to trade (at 1-2). Gal’s definition 
of a small economy mainly focuses on high concentration levels and entry barriers. Also see Competition 
Policy and Small Economies, OECD, 7 February 2003 
53  Gal has this reference to Latvia. See, Competition Policy and Small Economies, OECD, 7 February 2003. 
The same may not be true for Cyprus and Malta due to their geographic ‘isolation’. 
54  The reference to the ‘fall of barriers and markets becoming integrated’ was made already by Monti in 2001 
referring to the Nordic countries, n 51.  
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small country. Therefore, most markets in the countries analysed in this paper should 
be regarded as European rather than national. 
Equally, to elevate a matter even further, the main criterion of ‘the Effect on Interstate 
Trade between the Member States’ that triggers European instead of national law 
pursuant to Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003 is broadly interpreted.  In its leading case 
Societe Technique Miniere the CJEU stated that Article 101 TFEU applies to an agreement 
when it had “an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential on the patterns of trade 
between Member States”.55 In Windsurfing International the CJEU ruled that the then 
intra-Community trade would be affected even though the agreement was limited to the 
supply of the German market, as the manufacturers were free to sell their sailboards in 
other EU Member States.56 The so called Societe Technique Miniere formula was reiterated 
in more recent cases, such as ASNEF-EQUIFAX, where the court stated that an 
agreement if “capable of affecting trade between Member States, must be possible to 
foresee with a sufficient degree of probability, on the basis of a set of objective factors 
of law or of fact, that they have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on 
the pattern of trade between Member States”.57 Similar wording of “indirect” and 
“potential effect on trade” implying a rather broad interpretation were lately 
incorporated in the Commission’s Notice on the concept of effect on trade.58 In 
addition, the scope of ‘appreciability’ has been recently widened. In Expedia, which led 
to the revised De Minimis Notice,59 was held that “an agreement that may affect trade 
between Member States and that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its 
nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable 
restriction on competition”.60 Therefore, smaller undertakings are not immune from 
competition law by reason of their small size. Clearly, the current approach employed 
by the European Commission and the Courts implies that the element of ‘effect on 
trade between Member States’ should be easily met in small Member States due to their 
integrated national markets and therefore, the EU competition law provisions should 
                                                                                                                                         
55  Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, [1966] ECR 337, at para 
38. 
56  Case 193/83 Windsurfing International v. Commision, ECLI:EU:C:1986:75, [1986] ECR 611, at paras 20-22. 
57  Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v Asociación de Usuarios de 
Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), [2006] at para 34. 
58  Commission Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 81-96. The Notice restated the principles developed by the European 
Courts and sets out when the impact of agreements on trade between Member States is “appreciable”. 
Agreements are unlikely to appreciably to affect trade between member states if: i) the aggregate market 
share of the parties on any relevant market in the EU does not exceed 5%; and ii) in the case of horizontal 
agreements the aggregate annual EU turnover of the parties in the products concerned does not exceed 
EUR 40 million or, in the case of vertical agreements, the annual EU turnover of the supplier in the product 
concerned does not exceed EUR 40 million. 
59  Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition 
under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) OJ C 
291, 30 August 2014; Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining 
which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice SWD(2014) 198 final revised on 03/06/2015. 
De Minimis will not apply to agreements containing any restriction "by object" or any of the restrictions that 
are listed as "hardcore restrictions" in current or future Commission block exemption regulations.  
60  Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, at para 37. 
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be applied instead or simultaneously with domestic equivalents. Yet, this is not the case. 
This article will reveal that there are a lower number of cases where Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU were directly enforced in some of these ‘newer’ small Member States. 
However, there is no proof that there is a total under-enforcement of competition law 
in these jurisdictions. Instead, it seems that the NCAs rely on domestic equivalents.61  
As far as ‘smallness’ in the EU competition enforcement is concerned, there have been 
some recent references to small countries with the European Commission admitting 
that “the competition authorities in smaller Member States suffer from limited financial 
resources or very low staff numbers”.62 Yet, it also stressed that the NCAs of these 
countries must have the same capacity in terms of facilities and personnel as the NCAs 
in large Member States in order to be able to effectively enforce the EU competition 
rules. Paradoxically, the European Commission enjoys, a fortiori, broad discretion of 
interpretation of Article 13 Regulation 1/2003, and will reject a complaint even though 
the NCA may not be well equipped to deal with the case. While upholding the 
European Commission’s decision the General Court in Si.mobil stated that:  
“the requirement to ensure the effective application of EU competition rules 
cannot […] have the effect of imposing an obligation on the Commission to verify 
[…] whether the competition authority concerned has the institutional, financial 
and technical means available to it to enable it to accomplish the task entrusted to 
it by that regulation”.63  
Even though Regulation 1/2003 has introduced full parallel competences of the 
European Commission and NCAs, it seems that the European Commission is 
unwilling to relieve the NCA’s duty of its competence pursuant Article 11(6) Regulation 
1/2003. Therefore, even if the practice may affect trade between Member States, the 
undertakings from small countries may struggle to prove the existence of an EU 
interest and the European Commission can reject a complaint “on the sole ground that 
the infringement alleged did not have a significant effect on the functioning of the 
internal market.”64 
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that ‘smallness’ does matter, as at least in 
theory, small Member States are more exposed to the obligation of enforcement of EU 
                                                                                                                                         
61  This conclusion was reached at a recent study conducted by M. Botta, A. Svetlicinii, M. Bernatt, n 45. The 
author of this article has also reviewed the Annual Reports published by the NCAs of these analysed 
Member States to support this finding. Unfortunately, not all Member States provide statistical data (i.e. how 
many cases on domestic equivalents of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were investigated by the NCAs in these 
countries) and/or do not make distinction between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their domestic 
equivalents. 
62  Commission Staff Paper, n 13, at p 8. 
63  Case T-201/11 Si.mobil telekomunikacijske storitve d.d. v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1096 at para 57. 
In this case the applicant Si.mobil lodged a complaint to the European Commission under Article 102 
TFEU for allegedly abusive practices of Mobitel at the retail and wholesale functional levels of competition 
across a range of mobile communications markets in Slovenia. The Commission rejected the complaint as it 
was discovered that the NCA has already started investigation in these relevant markets, even though the 
Chairman of the NCA did not object for the European Commission to investigate the case. 
64  Si.mobil, ibid, at para 100. Also see Case T-273/09 Associazione ‘Giùlemanidallajuve’ v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:129, paras 87 and 110. 
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competition provisions. It seems that the European Commission is not willing to 
release the NCAs from this burden as the Si.mobil case illustrates. Yet, unfairly, all the 
NCAs (regardless of their size) must have basic equipment to be able to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as the same rules must be applied uniformly across the 
EU. The following sections will further expand on the challenges faced by these small 
‘newer’ Member States and their competition law enforcement experiences. 
V. NATIONAL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES OF SMALL ‘NEWER’ MEMBER 
STATES  
All competition policy and enforcement systems consist of essentially two components: 
the legal rules governing substance, competences and procedure, and the administrative 
structures and processes through which the legal rules are implemented.65 All Member 
States of the EU are free to design their own NCAs. Theoretically, a competition 
authority should be independent and impartial in order to be free from external 
influence either from the undertakings they supervise or from the State. Monti, 
however, argues that authorities cannot do whatever they wish and must be constrained 
in some ways by the markets (i.e. the NCA cannot overhaul the way markets operate) 
and by the State (i.e. it provides the NCA with the mandate and budget).66 Therefore, 
independence in this article is analysed in the context of operational independence, 
where government assigns a NCA a mission, and the NCA is free to implement its 
mission independently of government and industry. 
There are no EU rules providing for minimum guarantees of independence, save the 
generic requirement in Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003, which only requires that the 
Member States designate the competition authority responsible for the application of 
the EU competition rules in such a way that “the provisions of the Regulation are 
effectively complied with.” Given that Regulation 1/2003 does not compel the Member 
States to adopt a specific institutional framework for the implementation of EU 
competition rules either,67 it is the Member States’ responsibility to decide on the 
structure and organisation of their respective NCAs. The Member States may allocate 
different powers and functions to the different authorities and they may also decide on 
the administrative or judicial nature of the authority, subject to the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. Even though the institutional structure of the NCAs 
varies between Member States, two basic models of institutional design can be 
identified in the EU.68 First of all, the administrative model, where a single 
administrative authority has exclusive competence to investigate a case and take 
                                                                                                                                         
65  P.Lowe, ‘The design of competition policy institutions for the 21st century — the experience of the 
European Commission and DG Competition’, Competition Policy Newsletter, November 2008, Number 3, p 1. 
66  G.Monti, ‘Independence, Interdependence and Legitimacy: The EU Commission, National Competition 
Authorities, and the European Competition Network’, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 
2014/01, 2014. 
67  Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that “Member States shall designate the competition authority or 
authorities responsible for the application of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] in such a way that the provisions 
of this regulation are effectively complied with”. 
68  The European Union, ‘Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities’, 17-18 
December 2014, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)107. Also see Commission Staff Paper, Ibid, fn. 14. 
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enforcement decisions subject to judicial control.  Secondly, the bifurcated judicial 
model, where an administrative authority carries out the investigation and then brings 
the case before a court for a decision on substance, sanctions or both.69 All small 
‘newer’ Member States analysed in this paper have opted for the administrative model, 
except Estonia in criminal proceedings.  Before the 2011 reforms the NCAs of Malta70 
operated under the bifurcated judicial model, as the former Office for Fair Competition 
had an investigative role with decision-making vesting in the Commission for Fair 
Trading (replaced by the Competition and Consumer Appeals Tribunal). Currently, 
some Member States, such as Lithuania, apply this model with regard to the sanctions 
imposed on individuals.71 The importance of an effective division of investigation and 
decision-making72 has already been discussed with reference to the European 
Commission. The same arguments apply to enforcement by NCAs. The absence of an 
institutional division between the authority competent for investigations and the 
decision-making body seems to lead to some “prosecutorial path dependence”, 
nevertheless, some NCAs have a functional separation between the investigative and 
decision-making activities of their single administrative institutions,73 which 
compensate for this shortage. Additionally, the decisions of all NCAs of the analysed 
Member States are subject to judicial review.  
Historically, all NCAs were established well in advance to their accession to the EU 
around 1990s.74 However, their origins are far from similar. Given that former socialist 
countries had centralised economies with a policy to set and control prices, for 
instance, the NCAs of some these countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania were re-
organised from the Price Authorities. Their previous function to control prices had to 
change almost overnight into the protection of competitive process. The regulators, 
who worked under the old system, had to change and adopt a new system while 
developing their new regulatory skills.75 Initially, NCAs of the countries in question had 
                                                                                                                                         
69  The other models can also be identified, where, in addition to the main NCA, other sectoral regulators have 
competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (and domestic equivalents) to the sector for which they are 
competent. For instance, in the UK there are 9 authorities capable of enforcing the EU competition law 
provisions. 
70  In the context of breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs 
Authority Act VI of 2011. 
71  The Law on Competition of Lithuania has an exception with regard to CEOs where only the Vilnius 
Regional Administrative Court can impose sanctions (i.e. disqualification or a financial penalty) on these 
individuals. See Article 41(1) of the Law on Competition 23 March 1999 No VIII-1099, (last amended on 22 
March 2012 No XI-1937). 
72  The right to a fair trial and the right of defence are enshrined as general principles of EU law. 
73  For instance, in Cyprus the Commission for the Protection of Competition has a decision making power. 
Whereas the investigative responsibility falls within the Service. In Latvia, any decisions (final and 
procedural) are taken by Council, whereas investigation is done by divisions of Executive directorate. 
74  For instance, the Antimonopoly Office of Slovakia was established in 1990. The Monopoly Monitoring 
Committee, the predecessor of NCA of Latvia and the Agency of Prices and Competition, the predecessor 
of NCA of Lithuania were established in 1992. The Competition Protection Office of Slovenia was 
established in 1994. 
75  V.Nakrosis, ‘Assessing Governmental Capacities to Manage European Affairs: The Case of Lithuania’. In 
V.Pettai and J.Zielionka (eds.) The Road to the European Union, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Manchester 
University press, 2003, at 111 
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a strong governmental involvement, as they were part of a ministry or fell under the 
remit of the government’s supervision. For instance, the former Monopoly Monitoring 
Committee of Latvia was part of the Department for the Monitoring of Monopolies 
and Promotion of Competition under the Ministry of Economic Reform. The 
Competition Council of Lithuania initially existed within the Agency of Prices and 
Competition under the Ministry of Economy. This agency and its predecessors lacked 
formal independence from the government.76 The Office for Fair Competition of 
Malta was a directorate in the Consumer and Competition Division, which fell under 
the Ministry for Finance, the Economy and Investment. Finally, the Competition 
Protection Office of Slovenia, which was established in 1994, was organised as an 
institution within the Ministry of Economy.  
All NCAs of these countries have taken the necessary steps to improve a degree of 
independence. The majority of these countries now have independent Competition 
Authorities in place without any formal attachments to the Ministries. These include 
the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA), an independent body, which is accountable 
for the delivery of its objectives to the Croatian Parliament; the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition of the Republic of Cyprus (CPC); the Competition Council 
of the Republic of Lithuania; the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO); 
and the recently reformed Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA). 
Even though a few NCAs of these countries are still formally assigned to or come 
under the responsibility of a ministry, they are free from the government’s interference 
in deciding on individual cases or on the actual application of the law. For instance, 
although the Latvian Competition Council is a governmental institution of direct 
administration and it is subordinated to the Ministry of Economics in the form of 
supervision, the Ministry of Economics does not have the power to influence the 
investigations and the decisions of the cases taken by the Competition Council of 
Latvia, which are only reviewable by the court. Similarly, the Malta Competition and 
Consumer Affairs Authority (MCCAA) falls under the remit of the Department of 
Industrial and Employment Relations of the recently set up Ministry for Social 
Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties,77 nevertheless, the Authority is free 
from any form of interference.78 
It seems that independence of NCAs is on the EU agenda, as the institutional position 
of NCAs has been addressed in the framework of European Semester with the aim of 
ensuring effective competition enforcement across all Member States given their 
                                                                                                                                         
76  In 1995, the Agency was reorganised into two state administrative bodies: the State Competition and 
Consumer Protection Office, a governmental agency, which had the status of a permanent executive 
institution and the Competition Council, which acted as a collegial decision making body applying sanctions 
for violations of competition (while all the preparatory and investigatory work was carried out by the 
Competition Office). Both institutions were governmental agencies lacking formal independence from the 
government. 
77  The Ministry for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties was established in March 2013. 
78  The speech delivered by the Hon. Jason Azzopardi, Minister for fair competition, small business and 
consumers at the conference and training seminar for members of the judiciary on ‘EU competition law and 
its application in Malta’ on 13th September 2012, press release reference number PR 1986. 
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contribution to fostering competition as a growth-enhancing policy.79 Priority recently 
has been given to clear-cut shortcomings in the position of the NCA and their degree 
of independence. For instance, due to calls for greater independence following country 
specific recommendations, the former Competition Protection Office of Slovenia, a 
functionally independent authority, organised within the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Technology was transferred into an independent public agency – the 
Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) in January 2013.  Most recent 
institutional development occurred in Estonia, from 1 September 2015 the Estonian 
Competition Authority (ECA) moved from the remit of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communications to the area of government of the Ministry of Justice in 
order to increase the independence of the Authority’s performance of its tasks.  
VI. LIMITED FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES: POLICIES IN PLACE TO 
OVERCOME ‘SMALLNESS’ 
In the current budgetary and economic context, reforms of the competition 
enforcement framework in the Member States may impact on financial and human 
resources. All Member States are responsible for ensuring that their competition 
authorities are adequately equipped for their duties and able to act under suitable 
conditions for the execution of their tasks. However, there are no explicit requirements 
in Regulation 1/2003 with regard to the settings of NCAs as discussed in the previous 
section, which explicitly oblige the Member States to grant sufficient resources to their 
NCAs. Given that all NCAs of small ‘newer’ Member States are funded from the state 
budget, to run an effective authority requires political will and an ongoing commitment 
from the government. Table 2 reveals limited financial and human resources of the 
NCAs of these small ‘newer’ Member States. It should be noted that due to the 
institutional reforms some NCAs have moved from a single function authority to an 
integrated multi-functional authority, therefore, the number of personnel has increased. 
For instance, the Competition Board of Estonia before its reorganisation was down to 
12 members of staff,80 with the concerns being expressed it may affect the effectiveness 
of competition law enforcement in Estonia. Similarly, Malta has also increased its intake 
of personnel due to its newly integrated enlarged authority, but the Office for 
Competition is the smallest of all four entities. Yet, despite these institutional swellings, 
the budgets of these NCAs are still very small. For instance, the annual budget of the 
CMA (the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority) is about £65 million, referring to 
20 times larger budget than in most of these countries.  
  
                                                                                                                                         
79  Commission Staff Paper, n 13, at p. 12. 
80  J. Poldroos, Head of Supervisory Department, ‘Latest Developments in Competition Supervision’, the paper 
presented during the conference ‘The New Competition Authority – New Challenges’ held in Tallinn, 11 
November 2008. Also see, ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2008. 
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Table 2. Resources of the NCAs in small ‘newer’ Member States  
Member State NCA budget for 2013/2014 Personnel 
Croatia 13.1 mil Kuna (in 
2013)=EUR 1.7mil 
51 (10 support staff) 
Cyprus x 24 
Estonia EUR 2 mil 49 (18 in Competition 
division) 
Latvia EUR 1.06 mil 35 
Lithuania EUR 1.6 mil 72 (25 support staff) 
Malta EUR 3.5 mil (in 2013) 120 (46 support staff 
Slovakia EUR 2 mil 55 (18 support staff) 
Slovenia EUR 1.25 mil (in 2013) 27 (2 support staff 
(x – information was not available) (various sources were used to obtain this information, including the Annual 
Reports published by the NCAs) 
Given that limited resources may affect effectiveness of EU competition enforcement, 
the competition enforcement regimes have been strengthened in several Member States 
in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding of Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality (MoU) with the Member States benefiting from a financial-assistance 
programme. Surprisingly, no such assistance has been offered to the analysed 
countries.81 
This section will further explore how the NCAs of the small ‘newer’ Member States 
address their limited resources. Two main policies will be identified that are in place in 
these jurisdictions to overcome their ‘smallness’. They are i) changes to the institutional 
setting through joining competition authorities with other regulatory agencies; and ii) 
prioritisation policies, allowing the NCAs to focus on severe anti-competitive cases 
instead of following on all meritless complaints. Additionally, other enforcement tools, 
such as commitment decisions,82 have also been recently introduced in these countries 
to save limited resources on extensive investigations, as an NCA drops the case in 
exchange for a commitment from the undertaking under investigation to implement 
measures to stop its presumed anti-competitive behaviour.83 While this currently 
                                                                                                                                         
81  Note: the institutional reforms in Slovenia were initiated following country specific recommendations in the 
framework of the European Semester. 
82  For a general discussion on commitment decisions, see N. Dunne, ‘Commitment decisions in EU 
competition law’, (2014) 10(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 399-444. 
83  For instance, the amendment to the Competition Act in 2013 in Estonia allows the Competition Authority 
to accept commitments. In 2014 commitment decisions were issued in two cases AS Tallinna Kute and AS 
G4S. See the Estonian Annual Report of 2014. In Lithuania the Competition Council accepted 
commitments by five producers/suppliers of pharmaceutical products and three distributors in 2011 to 
guarantee that the prices and other conditions for the supply of pharmaceuticals to be resold through public 
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limited practice84 may spare some resources, it is not without costs: they barely provide 
any guidance on the interpretation and application of the law, which is especially 
important for the ‘newer’ Member States with a little experience of competition law. 
Given that commitments are voluntary and normally are not subject to judicial review, 
this may also stop further development of the law.85 
i). Integrated institutional settings 
Given limited budgetary resources of these small ‘newer’ Member States, governments 
quite often look for cost-saving options. There exist many different institutional models 
and find the optimal institutional design is a complex matter. Many jurisdictions have 
found success with very different designs and what works well in one jurisdiction may 
not always work well in another. Against this backdrop, many Member States have 
created “multi-function” agencies by merging the competition authority with the 
authorities responsible for other economic policy functions, such as consumer 
protection, sector regulation, technical regulation control or public procurement 
control. The governments of the analysed small ‘newer’ Member States have also been 
experimenting with their institutional settings.  
The best example of this institutional experimentation is Estonia. In response to the 
economic slowdown in January 2008 the Estonian Competition Board merged with the 
former regulators into a single Estonian Competition Authority (ECA), consisting of a 
Competition Division, Railway and Energy Regulatory Division and Communications 
Division. The intention behind this transformation was to pull together the experience 
and synergies of the regulatory bodies in relation to common tasks, to strengthen state 
supervision, and to make better use of the limited resources of a small country.86 In 
2012, following a rather unorthodox goal to avoid setting up new regulators,87 the ECA 
was granted additional competences concerning the supervision of the aviation sector 
with the new tasks being absorbed by the Railway and Communications Regulatory 
Division, which was re-named into the Communications Regulatory Division (to reflect 
                                                                                                                                         
tenders are decided independently by the distributor itself. The investigation was carried out under Article 
101 TFEU and its domestic equivalent. Given that no factual data on the existence of resale price 
maintenance was found, the Competition Council decided to terminate the investigation subject to the 
commitments offered by the undertakings in question. Resolution of 21 July 2011. Interestingly, the G4S 
commitments in Lithuania were rejected and an infringement decision was reissued. See S.Keserauskas, 
‘Lithuania: Competition Council’, the European Antitrust Review 2016, Global Competition Review. 
84  All the analysed NCAs in this paper have the power to adopt commitment decisions (in accordance with 
Article 9 Regulation 1/2003). See ECN Working Group on Cooperation Issues, Results of the questionnaire 
on the reform of Member States national competition laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003, 22 May 2013. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html (accessed 1 October 2015). 
85  For instance, due to the fact that merger cases have barely been tested in court, there was slow progress of 
merger control development in Lithuania.  
86  See, ECA, Annual Report of Estonia 2007. Available at: http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/?id=11591 
(accessed 1 October 2015).  
87  Roundtable on Changes in Institutional Design of Competition Authorities, Note by Estonia, 17-18 
December 2014,  DAF/COMP/WD(2014)91 
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the primary subject of its current activities).88 In 2014 further development took place 
when the Communications Regulatory Division was transferred to the Technical 
Regulatory Authority due to its previous complex division of competences between 
two authorities: the Competition Authority and Regulatory Authority. The ECA is 
currently a multi-purpose agency with antitrust89 and regulatory functions, in the fields 
of fuel and energy, postal services, railway, water supply and aviation on the basis and 
to the extent prescribed by law.90 Surprisingly, merging its competition authority with 
the consumer protection agency was not taken seriously in Estonia due to the belief 
that “application of consumer protection legislation was much too dissimilar compared 
to the functions of economic and competition regulators”.91 
It seems that Malta has followed these footprints in order to rationalise their resources 
as well. The new NCA of Malta – the Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority 
(MCCAA) which was established on 23 May 2011, and incorporated the Market 
Surveillance Directorate and Technical Regulation Division. In contrast to Estonia, the 
MCCAA also embrace consumer protection. Hence, there are currently four divisions 
within the MCCAA: the Office for Competition; the Office for Consumer Affairs; the 
Technical Regulations Division; and, the Standards and Metrology Institute. The ‘multi-
functionality’ to a lesser extent is also reflected in the NCAs of other Member States. 
For instance, the Competition Council of Latvia in addition to the enforcement of 
competition law (excluding State Aid)92 is also responsible for abuse of significant 
market power regulation in the food and non-food retail sectors vis-à-vis suppliers 
(dominant position in retail trade), and Law on Advertising.93 Along similar lines, the 
Competition Council of Lithuania also carries out functions assigned by other laws, 
such as the Law on Prices, Law on the Railway Transport Sector Reform, Law on 
Prohibition of Unfair Practices of Retail Undertakings, Law on Advertising and Law on 
Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices.94 The Competition 
Council of Lithuania also deals with State Aid. 
It seems that not all NCAs of small ‘newer’ Member States follow this integration 
trend. For instance, the Commission for the Protection of Competition of Cyprus, the 
Croatian Competition Agency,95 and the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 
are single function authorities with their focus on the enforcement and further 
                                                                                                                                         
88  See, ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2012. Available at: http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/?id=11591 
(accessed 1 October 2015).  
89  State Aid falls under the Ministry of Finance in Estonia. 
90  Roundtable Discussion, Ibid, fn.87. 
91  ID, fn.87, at p.4 
92  State Aid falls under the Ministry of Finance in Latvia. 
93  The Official web-site of the Competition Council of Latvia, available at: http://www.kp.gov.lv/en/about-
competition-council/aim-tasks (accessed 20 October 2015). 
94  The main powers Competences and Powers of the Council under the Lithuanian Law, the Council official 
website, available at: http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=contacts&con_meniu=compet (accessed 20 
October 2015). 
95  State aid in Croatia from the Agency was transferred in the hands of Ministry of Finance in April 2014. 
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development of the competition provisions, excluding State Aid.96 Along similar lines, 
the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency has competence to enforce all the 
provisions of competition law, including State Aid. 
The institutional settings of the NCAs of the analysed countries varies largely – from 
single function authorities (in countries, such as Croatia, Cyprus, Slovakia and 
Slovenia), to bi-functional authorities, such as in Latvia and Lithuania, and finally, 
multi-function authorities in Estonia and Malta. It appears that the governments of 
some Member States have been more active than others in order to address their 
limited resources. Apart from cost savings, there are several benefits distilled from the 
experience of integrated institutional designs, including from Estonia. First of all, by 
pooling together sector-specific and competition knowledge, expertise and experience, 
this enables a multi-functional authority to carry out analysis more efficiently.97 Given 
that a multi-disciplinary team works together and the same decision body overlooks the 
work of different departments, reinforces coherence and ensures the soundness of 
decisions. Secondly, consumers may benefit from having a more powerful regulator, 
acting on their behalf with strong powers to ensure that markets are working efficiently. 
Finally, the model of integrating competition and regulatory authorities simplifies the 
regulatory landscape that is more appropriate for these countries’ small size, potentially 
increasing competition in regulated sectors (furthering liberalisation),98 securing greater 
stability and consistency in regulatory decisions. Even though the European 
Commission follows whether such amalgamation of competences does not lead to a 
weakening of competition enforcement, merging authorities is part of a Member State’s 
discretion and they are free to experiment in order to discover the most suitable model 
for them. 
ii). Prioritisation policies 
The process of prioritisation enables the NCAs to concentrate their limited resources in 
specific areas identified as being of greatest importance, thus, increasing efficiency in 
their functioning and operation. Given that competition law is applicable to all sectors 
of the economy, investigations of suspected infringements of competition law may be 
extensive in scope and may involve complex analyses. By prioritising their enforcement 
actions, the NCAs are able to make more effective use of their limited resources, which 
is especially important for small Member States due to their limited NCAs budgets. Yet, 
this has not always been the case. Many ‘newer’ Member States were bound by the 
legality principle which entails a legal duty to consider all complaints formally filed.99 
                                                                                                                                         
96  From 24 April 2014 all former responsibilities and activities of the CCA in the area of State aid in Croatia 
fall under the competence of the Ministry of Finance. Available at: http://www.aztn.hr/en/cases/  
(accessed 22 October 2015). 
97  For instance, a recent case in Estonia in the district heating sector concerning AS Tallinna Küte is an 
example of synergy between the work of Competition Division and Energy and Water Regulatory Division. 
See ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2014. 
98  JMM Quemada, Chairman of the National Commission for Markets and Competition, ‘Spain: National 
Authority for Markets and Competition’, The European Antitrust Review 2016, Global Competition 
Review. 
99  For instance, the NCAs of Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta had an obligation to act upon any complaint.  
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However, there have recently been some developments in this field. A dynamic in this 
area especially intensified after the ECN endorsed a recommendation in 2013 on the 
power to set priorities, which identified a need for further convergence on the ability of 
the authorities to set priorities when choosing which cases to pursue.100 
Unsurprisingly, many small ‘newer’ Member States have recently introduced 
prioritisation policies in their jurisdictions. Prioritisation policies are not uniform across 
jurisdictions, as they are meant to be designed to address the NCAs’ powers and 
functions as set out in the law and the environment in which the authorities operate.101 
In their prioritisation policies the NCAs of these Member States define some basic 
objectives, which vary across the Member States. For instance, the Competition 
Council of Lithuania, which was empowered to set its own priorities and published the 
Rules on the prioritisation of cases in 2012,102 proclaims that effective competition and 
consumer welfare are the two main goals to be achieved.103 Similarly, Latvia, which 
developed and published Case prioritization strategy in 2014 is focusing on two main 
categories: protection of competition and development of the competition culture;104 
whereas, Malta and Slovakia seem to centre solely on consumer welfare. Priorities are 
not set in stone and do change to reflect the market conditions.  
Short-term and long-term priorities can be identified. Most NCAs rely on a set of 
generally broad and/or non-exhaustive prioritisation criteria for long term strategies. 
For instance, the Competition Council of Lithuania assesses enforcement priority based 
on three principles: i) the expected impact of its intervention on effective competition 
and consumer welfare; ii) the intervention’s strategic importance; and iii) the rational 
use of resources (the resources needed are compared to the expected success of the 
intervention). Similar criteria are set by the AMO in Slovakia105 and MCCAA by 
Malta.106 A range of rather broad criteria are defined in competition law of Cyprus, 
                                                                                                                                         
100  ECN Recommendation On the Power to Set Priorities, December 2013 
101  H. Jennings, ‘Prioritisation in Antitrust Enforcement – a Finger in Many Pies’, Competition Law International 
11(1) 1 April 2015 
102  Resolution No. 1S-89 ‘Concerning Priority of the Activities of the Lithuanian Competition Council’ 
(Resolution of Priority) on 2 July 2012 
103  The Competition Council of Lithuania further defines that that the most severe, negative effects on 
effective competition and consumer welfare are usually caused by actions that (i) directly affect prices of 
goods, their quality and variety; (ii) directly limit the possibility of the undertakings to act in the relevant 
market by closing or partitioning market or through expulsion from the market; (iii) directly affect the 
relevant part of the undertakings or consumers operating in Lithuania; (iv) directly related with goods 
intended for consumers. Resolution No. 1S-89 ‘Concerning Priority of the Activities of the Lithuanian 
Competition. 
104  The Competition Council of Latvia, Annual Report of Latvia, 2014. 
105  The AMO of Slovakia identifies four criteria: i) gravity of an infringement; 2) importance of an investigation 
(which also refer to ‘end consumer’); 3) probability of success; and finally 4) strategic nature (in case the 
above criteria are not met, the AMO may still decide to deal with the case provided the set conditions are 
met). See, Its latest guidelines Prioritisation Policy of the AMO SR, 2015 
106  Article 15 of the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority Act provides: (1) The Office for 
Competition may allocate different degrees of priority to the cases brought or pending before it and in 
doing so it shall take into consideration, inter alia, the following factors: (a) the degree of consumer harm 
resulting from the alleged or suspected infringement; (b) the extent of consumer benefit resulting from the 
intervention of the Office for Competition; (c) the nature and gravity of the alleged or suspected 
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which provides that the CPC of Cyprus shall take into account the public interest, the 
effects on competition and consumers, the strategic significance of a case for the CPC, 
the human resources available and any time frames applicable.107 In addition, some 
Member States, such as Malta and Slovakia will also prioritise the promotion of 
different ways of solving competition issues. Namely, whether an administrative 
proceeding by the NCA is the most effective way to deal with competition restriction 
or, instead, preference should be given to competition advocacy or sectoral inquiries. A 
good example of this choice is the Maltese School Uniforms market study, where the 
authority has chosen to use advocacy to pre-empt situations restricting competition and 
to rapidly increase the public’s awareness of the problem.108 
With regard to the short-term, it seems that the majority of the NCAs of these 
countries in addition to more traditional priorities of combating cartels and bid rigging 
in public procurement,109 circumscribe to measures aimed at raising public awareness 
and education, as well as ensuring quality participation of the organisation in 
international competition protection programs and networks.110 Other NCAs, such as 
Cyprus, refer to the promotion of cooperation with the neighbouring authorities, which 
is especially important for these small jurisdictions, as most businesses in these 
countries cross borders.111 In contrast to the Member States discussed above, 
prioritisation policy is less transparent in Estonia. This is most likely due to its 
integrated Competition Authority, where prioritisation can be complex given that the 
authority is also overlooking various sectors.  
In some Member States the NCAs decisions either not to initiate investigations or the 
rejection of non-priority complaints may be appealable in national courts.112 Even 
                                                                                                                                         
infringement; (d) the stage of investigation; (e) whether the alleged practices are still ongoing or whether 
harmful effects persist; and (f) whether the alleged unlawful conduct is being examined or can be better 
examined by another public authority under its regulatory regime. 
107  Cyprus: Amendments to Protection of Competition Law enter into Force (the Protection of Competition 
(Amendment) Law 2014 (Law No. 41(1)/2014)), ECN Briefs, 2014. Available at: 
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/02_2014/cy.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2015). 
108  The problem was that in the majority of cases, schools had exclusivity arrangements with particular 
suppliers. Schools were coming up with particular features for their uniforms making the school uniform 
very specific to the school. Therefore, it was difficult for the parents to match the uniform or parts thereof 
and purchase from a supplier other than that indicated by the school. The report was published in May 
2012. See the MMCCA Annual Report of 2011-2012. For further discussion, see Intergovernmental Group 
of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Roundtable on: Prioritization and resource allocation as a tool for agency 
effectiveness, Contribution by Malta, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013 
109 Identified as priorities in Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.  
110  Defined by the Competition Council of Latvia. See Annual Report of 2014.  
111  “As a matter of policy priorities for the coming period, the CPC points out the need to: enhance its 
advocacy role and promote competition culture and compliance with competition rules in Cyprus; promote 
its cooperation with the Hellenic Competition Authority, particularly in terms of knowledge and experience 
exchange; and continue its market monitoring for any impediments or restrictions of competition in crucial 
sectors of the economy”. See L. Christodoulou, ‘Cyprus: Commission for the Protection of Competition’, in 
GCR, The European Antitrust Review 2016 (GCR, 2016). 
112  For instance, Article 32 of the Law on Competition in Lithuania, 23 March 1999 No VIII-1099, (last 
amended on 22 March 2012 No XI-1937). The ECN and its recommendation suggests that jurisdictions 
using informal means of closure or rejection mostly do not foresee a right of appeal for complainants. In 
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though the Competition Council of Lithuania is able to refuse to investigate cases or 
close ongoing investigations, these can be challenged in its courts. It seems that so far 
the courts are willing to employ a ‘stand back’ approach. For instance, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania upheld two Council‘s decisions not to open an 
investigation in 2014. 
It seems safe to conclude that the NCAs of the analysed countries (except Estonia) 
have introduced prioritisation policies to address their limited resources. Apart from 
traditional priorities of combating cartels and bid rigging in public procurement, these 
countries have their unique priorities, such as raising public awareness and building 
competition culture. Finally, the prioritisation policies further support the recurring 
theme in this article that small countries are more exposed to the EU law enforcement, 
as the majority of great importance cases will have ‘effect on trade between the 
Member States’. For instance, this trend is noticeable in Lithuania; since the 
introduction of prioritisation,113 during the period of 2012 and 2014 out of six cases 
only one case was decided solely on national law.114   
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF EU COMPETITION LAW BY ‘NEWER’ SMALL 
MEMBER STATES AND CHALLENGES FACED 
Without any transitional period from the 1st day of joining the EU, all these small 
‘newer’ Member States have an obligation to directly enforce Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU in their jurisdictions once the element of ‘the Effect on Interstate Trade 
between the Member States’ is triggered. Table 3 reveals that despite its small size 
Slovenia had dealt with the most cases involving Articles 101 and 102 TFEU during the 
analysed period from 1 May 2004 to 31 March 2015. Even though these ‘newer’ small 
Member States are less privileged as discussed in the previous sections,115 the statistical 
data in Table 3 uncovers that the number of cases involving Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU of the small ‘newer’ Member States are comparable with the small pre-2004 
accession Member States.116 For instance, both Cyprus and Luxembourg had an almost 
identical number of cases (14 as far as new investigations are concerned, and 6 and 5 
respectively under Article 11(4) Regulation 1/2003). Along similar lines, Slovakia had a 
very similar number of reported cases with other comparable countries, such as 
                                                                                                                                         
this respect, they rely on the concept that the NCA acts predominantly in the public interest and that the 
legal framework generally provides sufficient means to complainants to seek recourse against infringers of 
competition law before national courts. ECN Recommendation On the Power to Set Priorities, December 
2013. 
113  Resolution No. 1S-89 ‘Concerning Priority of the Activities of the Lithuanian Competition Council’ 
(Resolution of Priority) on 2 July 2012. 
114  See Competition Council of Lithuania, Annual Reports of 2012, 2013, and 2014. Most recent Annual 
Reports of other Member States, such as Malta, do not seem to distinguish between Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU and their domestic equivalents.  
115  See section II. The author supports the theory on a gradual competition culture development. A.Mateus, 
‘Why should National Competition Authorities be independent and how should they be accountable?’ 
(2007) 3(1) European Competition Journal  17-30. 
116  Table 4. 
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Finland.117 Ireland, one of the ‘older’ small Member States, on the other hand, reported 
a smaller number of cases than Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The lowest 
number of cases was reported in Estonia, Malta, and Croatia (which most recently 
joined the EU on 1 July 2013), which will be further explored in the following sections. 
Table 3. Enforcement Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the post-2004 accession 
Member States (1st May 2004 – 31st March 2015)  
Member State New investigations Cases (Article 11(4) Reg. 1/2003) 
Croatia 3 0 
Cyprus 14 6 
Estonia 8 3 
Latvia 19 6 
Lithuania 22 20 
Malta 5 3 
Slovakia 29 17 
Slovenia 31 28 
(source the ECN website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html) 
Table 4. Enforcement Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the pre-2004 accession 
Member States (1st May 2004 – 31st March 2015)  
Member State New investigations Cases (Article 11(4) Reg. 1/2003) 
Denmark 77 46 
Finland 29 11 
Ireland  18 2 
Luxembourg 14 5 
(source the ECN website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html) 
Given that, theoretically, small countries are more exposed to EU competition law 
provisions as discussed in Section IV, one may wonder whether there should have been 
a higher number of cases initiated in these countries based on Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. For instance, Botta, Svetlicinii and Bernatt, whose study focused on all ‘newer’ 
Member States, including small Member States, argue that they seem to have a narrow 
interpretation of the criterion of effect on trade in contrast to the European 
                                                                                                                                         
117  Denmark in this case is an exception, as it reported the largest amount of cases, similar to large Member 
States, such as the UK. 
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Commission and Union case-law.118 This is probably the case in some Member States. 
Yet, to make a certain conclusion it would have been necessary to conduct in-depth 
empirical research and analyse borderline or national cases with a potential cross-border 
element in all ‘newer’ Member States. For instance, in Lithuania potential effects on 
trade between Member States were considered in the frozen bakery case,119 where the 
Council found that the food retail chain MAXIMA LT and frozen bakery producer 
Mantinga had been engaged in RPM (Resale Price Maintenance) for a decade within the 
territory of Lithuania and therefore infringed Article 101 TFEU and its domestic 
equivalent. Even though the parties in question argued that the ‘actual’ effects on trade 
between Member States were not proven, the Council decided that there was sufficient 
to establish the ‘potential’ effects on trade between Member States given the price list 
was set by the market leader food retailer that might have affected other foreign 
undertakings.120 
Therefore, in order to avoid any generalisation, this article evaluates an overall capacity 
of the NCAs of these small ‘newer’ Member States and other factors that might have 
had ramifications on the enforcement of the EU competition law provisions. 
Therefore, this section will articulate on the challenges faced by the NCAs of small 
‘newer’ Member States from a broader perspective embracing on limited enforcement 
competences of the NCAs, complex institutional and enforcement frameworks, and 
judicial review obstruction. 
(i). Limited enforcement competences of NCAs of small ‘newer’ Member States  
While Regulation 1/2003 refrains from imposing any specific requirements concerning 
the NCAs, nevertheless, the limited case law of the CJEU on this general provision 
suggests that it may require granting powers to the NCAs which were ruled out (or not 
foreseen) by the legislator.121 Initially, some NCAs of the analysed Member States 
lacked competence to enforce the EU competition provisions. For instance, the 
competences and powers of the Commission for the Protection of Competition of the 
Republic of Cyprus were enhanced and extended to accommodate the requirements 
pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 only after the European Commission initiated the 
proceedings against Cyprus due to its NCA lacking power to apply Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.122 Furthermore, as from 2008, the members of the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition have been appointed on a full-time basis. Therefore, the 
enforcement of the EU competition provisions has started in Cyprus only from April 
2008 when the new legislation on the Protection of Competition Law came into 
force.123  
                                                                                                                                         
118  This finding was delivered by Botta, Svetlicinii and Bernatt, n 45. 
119  Decision No. 2S-14/2014 
120  See paras 377-383, Decision No. 2S-14/2014. In addition, UAB Mantinga exports about 50% of its 
production aboard. UAB MAXIMA LT belongs to a larger international group, consisting of food retail 
undertakings active in Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Poland. 
121  See, for instance, Case C-439/08, VEBIC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:739, [2010] ECR I-2471 
122  Case Lumiere TV Public Company Ltd./Multichoice (national file reference 11.17.14/2006). 
123  Law No. 13(I)/2008 
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Similarly, the Competition Act of Slovakia until its amendment of June 2009 included a 
disputable provision which restrained the AMO’s powers in some sectors, which was 
challenged by the European Commission.124 The European Commission formally 
requested the Slovak Republic to amend a provision of the Slovak Competition Act 
that limits the Slovak NCA’s power to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to 
anticompetitive behaviour in the electronic communications, energy and postal 
sectors.125  Despite the limited scope of the Slovak Competition Law, it seems that the 
enforcement of the EU competition law provisions was not really affected. Out of all 
the analysed Member States in this paper, Slovakia has reported the most EU cases 
after Slovenia.126 
Given that all Member States had to meet the defined criteria before joining the EU, 
the EU conditionality impelled the Croatian authorities to accept many reforms.127 One 
of the demands initiated by the European Commission was to widen the competence 
of the Croatian Competition Authority in the banking sector. Initially, the Croatian 
National Bank oversaw competition law enforcement in this sector. The enforcement 
of competition provisions in the banking sector was handed to the NCA before Croatia 
joined the EU in July 2013. 
(ii). Complex institutional and enforcement frameworks 
Originally, some of the NCAs of small ‘newer’ Member States had difficulties with their 
limited enforcement powers to handle investigations, reach decisions and impose 
persuasive fines. Given the scarce enforcement record of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
in some small ‘newer’ Member States, this sub-section will focus on three Member 
States with the lowest number of reported EU cases, namely Malta, Estonia, and 
Croatia. It will elaborate on the challenges faced in these Member States to enforce EU 
competition law and any reforms taking place to rectify them. Even though it is too 
early to canvass the Croatian’s EU competition law enforcement due to its recent 
accession in the EU, nevertheless, its readiness to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
can be assessed.  
Table 3 proves that Malta has reported the lowest number of cases involving Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU (save Croatia). The main cause of this is Malta’s struggle with its 
institutional settings and the division of enforcement power. Initially, the Office for 
Fair Competition, the former NCA of Malta128 had an investigative role and could issue 
non-binding decisions, whereas a decision-making vested in the Commission for Fair 
Trading (a specialised Tribunal, currently called the Competition and Consumer 
Appeals Tribunal). While the competences of the Office for Fair Competition were 
                                                                                                                                         
124  A.Orsulova and D.Raus, Competition Law in Slovak Republic, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, at p.67 
125  See the Commission press Release IP/09/200 of 02.02.2009. 
126  See Table 3. 
127  Vrcek argues that the scope of EU conditionality for Croatia has been more stringent than for previous East 
European states. See, B.Vrcek, ‘Croatia as the 28th EU Member State: Impact on Competition Policy’ AAI 
Working Paper No. 13-04, 23 August 2013.  
128  In the context of breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs 
Authority Act VI of 2011. 
Public EU competition law enforcement in small ‘newer’ Member States 
  (2016) 12(1) CompLRev 28 
expanded in 2004 allocating minor breaches, only the 2011 Law amendments conferred 
full powers on the Office for Competition (which was renamed), to decide cases 
including infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and impose administrative fines, 
alongside the power to investigate, whilst providing for a right of appeal on points of 
law and fact to a specialised Tribunal and a right of appeal on points of law only from 
the decision of the Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. Even though a bifurcated model 
may work for some Member States, it was not effective in Malta, as a case investigated 
by the Office for Fair Competition had to be proven afresh before the Commission. 
Therefore, it prolonged the proceedings and slowed competition law enforcement. The 
recent 2011 reforms instigated a move from a bifurcated model into an integrated 
authority which has led to a case being concluded more rapidly: once the Office has 
concluded its investigation and the parties have been given the opportunity to be heard, 
the Director General can immediately issue a decision.129 There has been another 
significant development in Malta in order to improve its enforcement of competition 
law. While some Member States in the EU have opted for criminal law in order to 
combat restrictive practices more efficiently, Malta has recently substituted its criminal 
sanctions with administrative fines. This is because criminal sanctions prior to 2012 
endured the need of fresh proceedings being brought before the Court of Magistrates 
with a different burden of proof. This complex system in practice meant that no 
criminal proceedings were ever instituted and no fines were imposed notwithstanding 
the decisions finding infringements of competition law.130 Accordingly, these new 
developments should increase the deterrent effect of the law and improve the 
authority’s effectiveness in its enforcement. 
Estonia, by contrast, is known for its font of criminal law in competition law and was 
one of the first countries in Europe to criminalise such behaviour.131  It can be argued 
that criminal law in Estonia was introduced for two main reasons. First of all, the 
nature of penal law in Estonia is rather atypical due to the impossibility to efficiently 
sanction persons other than criminal proceedings.132 Secondly, it can be speculated that 
criminal offence was also introduced to secure effective enforcement of competition 
law: to raise the awareness of the importance of competition law and to strengthen its 
position, as non-compliance ‘will be taken seriously’. Generally speaking, Estonia 
employs a complex diversified procedural framework of competition law 
enforcement.133 This is because its public enforcement of competition law can be 
pursued through different channels: 1) administrative; 2) misdemeanour,134 or 3) 
                                                                                                                                         
129  S.A.Zahra, ‘An Update on the Application of EU Competition Law in Malta’, EU Competition Law and its 
Application in Malta, Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law 13 -14 September 2012. 
130  Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Roundtable on: Prioritization and resource 
allocation as a tool for agency effectiveness, Contribution by Malta, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013 
131  It introduced criminal offense in 2002. See ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2014. 
132  The ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2014. 
133  See, Botta, Svetilicinii and Bernatt, n 45, at 1261. 
134  These infringements are prosecuted under the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure and include abuse of a 
dominant position; implementing a concentration without clearance; and failure to perform its obligations 
by an undertaking in control of an essential facility. See, Code of Misdemeanour Procedure, passed 
22.05.2002, (RT1 I 2002, 50, 313). 
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criminal proceedings by the NCA or by the public prosecutors through courts. Criminal 
proceedings follow a complex three-tier system embracing the Competition Authority, 
the Prosecutor’s Office and the Estonian Court System, which also encompasses three 
levels, such as the Court of First Instance, the Court of Second Instance and the 
Supreme Court.135 All three tiers of Estonian enforcement authorities have different 
investigative and decision-making powers.136 For instance, the Competition Authority 
has investigative power in administrative proceedings, whereas the Prosecutor’s Office 
has significantly greater investigative powers in criminal proceedings, as it can inspect 
private homes and cars; it also has the right to use certain means of surveillance, e.g. 
phone tapping and imitating a crime.137  
Competition related offences have been criminalised rather extensively in Estonia, 
covering not just the hard-core restrictions, but also embracing repeated 
anticompetitive practices, such as abuse of a dominant position,138 failure to perform 
obligations by an undertaking in control of an essential facility, implementing a 
concentration without permission to concentrate, or violating a prohibition on 
concentration or the terms of permission to concentrate.139 Due to the complicated 
nature of competition law and consequently limited enforcement, Estonia decided to 
decriminalise all these offences, save anti-competitive agreements, effective from 
January 2015;140 that is more in line with most Member States which operate criminal 
offences in addition to administrative proceedings. Potentially, the limited scope of 
criminal offences in Estonia may improve the enforcement of the EU competition 
rules. This is because there is currently a clear priority by the ECA (Estonian 
Competition Authority) to pursue criminal enforcement of domestic competition 
                                                                                                                                         
135  Either the Estonian Competition Authority or the Prosecutor’s Office may initiate a criminal investigation 
with regard to anticompetitive practices. After the Competition Authority has concluded its investigation, 
the case will be fully taken over by the Prosecutor’s Office, which will then forward the case to court if it is 
confident that there is sufficient evidence to prove an infringement. The Court of First Instance will start a 
criminal hearing. The decisions of the Court of First Instance are appealable to the Court of Second 
Instance and finally, as a last resort to the Supreme Court. For further discussion, see M. Peterson and G. 
Kuru, Estonia: Overview of the law and enforcement regime relating to cartels, In N. Parr & E. Burrows 
(eds.), Cartels: Enforcement, Appeals & Damages Actions, Global Legal Group, at 63-68. 
136  For instance, the amendment to the Competition Act in 2013 in Estonia further aligns the Act with 
provisions which allow the Competition Authority to use the rights granted to the NCAs pursuant to 
Regulation 1/ 2003 for establishing interim measures and approving commitments. Therefore, the ECA 
now may on its own initiative and in the case of urgency issue a precept to a natural or legal person to 
perform a required act or refrain from an illegal act if there is a risk of serious and irreparable breach of 
competition as set out in the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or domestic equivalents.   With the amendments to 
the Competition Act the ECA has also been given a right to approve commitments proposed by an 
undertaking to remedy disturbance in the competitive situation without taking a final position on whether 
the violation occurred or not.   
137  Prior authorisation from the court is required in both cases. For further discussion, see M. Peterson and G. 
Kuru, Estonia: Overview of the law and enforcement regime relating to cartels, In N. Parr & E. Burrows 
(eds.), Cartels: Enforcement, Appeals & Damages Actions, Global Legal Group, at 63-68. 
138  Penal Code, passed 6.06.2001, RT I 2001, 61, 364, entry into force 1.09.2002, para 399(1) 
139  Ibid, para 402. 
140  From 1 January 2015, all other offences are treated as misdemeanours for which the maximum fine is 
significantly smaller and imprisonment is not possible. 
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rules,141 which in turn leads to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU being 
overlooked. Several scholars concluded that divergent procedural rules and institutional 
settings have affected the enforcement of EU competition rules in Estonia.142 There is 
still an ongoing debate on a potential new penal law approach to anti-competitive 
agreements and related procedural rules. 
Finally, the development of the institutional and enforcement framework in Croatia has 
not been without complications. Initially, the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) was 
empowered to establish infringements of competition law, but only the Croatian 
misdemeanour courts could directly sanction infringing undertakings. Yet, the 
misdemeanour courts typically waited until administrative courts issued judgments 
provided the Agency’s decisions were appealed. Therefore, this process caused 
excessive delays leading to a lapse of the period of prescription and as a rule of thumb 
the misdemeanour courts rarely issued fines, which eventually resulted in inadequate 
protection of competition in Croatia.143 For instance, in 2007 the CCA unveiled a cartel 
between 14 bus operators, where the parties were found to have fixed bus fares on 
some routes. Yet, the court only imposed a symbolic fine of K 10,000 (approximately 
€1,314) on only one undertaking involved and K 6,000 (approximately €788) on the 
natural personnel in charge.144 Additionally, before conducting a dawn raid, the CCA 
must ask the administrative court to issue a warrant with the implicated undertaking 
having the right to be heard before the search, which jeopardised any surprise effect of 
the planned dawn raid. This is why this instrument of a dawn raid was never used until 
October 2010, when the CCA became authorised to do so.145 
In preparation to the accession of EU, the new Competition Act of October 2010146 
introduced a number of amendments encompassing the institutional strengthening of 
the Agency in terms of its powers and tools. Infringements of competition rules are no 
longer treated as misdemeanors, instead, they are considered sui generis violations and 
                                                                                                                                         
141  For instance, Svetlicinii claims that a significant part of the resources of the ECA’s Competition Division is 
directed towards investigation of criminal offences. For further discussion, see A. Svetlicinii, ‘Enforcement 
of EU Competition Rules in Estonia: Substantive Convergence and Procedural Divergence’ (2014) 7(9) 
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 67-85. Furthermore, the Director General of the ECA, Mart Ots, 
expressed that the year of 2012 was considered the most successful year for decisions, where a conviction 
was made in three criminal cases handled by the ECA. See the ECA, Annual Report of 2012. 
142  See Botta, Svetilicinii and Bernatt, n 45. 
143  J. P. Kaufman,  ‘Enforcement of competition rules in Croatia – challenges and the way forward’ the paper 
presented at a pre-conference workshop CFI Regional Conference on Business Environment Reform in South East 
Europe: “Growth and Competitiveness: Weathering the Crisis and Looking Ahead”, Tirana, November 17, 2009. 
Available at: http://web.efzg.hr/dok/PRA/jpecotic/Enforcement%20of%20competition%20rules%20in% 
20Croatia.pdf (accessed on 1 November 2015). 
144  For further discussion, see F.Urlesberger, ‘Croatia: Agency requires more force’, International Financial Law 
Review, 1 October 2008. Available at: http://www.iflr.com/Article/2025667/Croatia-Agency-requires-more-
force.html (accessed 1 November 2015). 
145  C.Haid and M.Bradvica, ‘Ahead of Croatia’s EU Accession – a Snapshot of Competition Law Enforcement 
and Anticipated Changes’, 2013. Available: http://roadmap2013.schoenherr.eu/competition-law-
enforcement-and-changes/ (accessed 1 November 2015). 
146  Official Gazette (Narodne novine) 79/09. The new Competition Act was adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament on 24 June 2009. 
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the Agency is empowered not just to establish infringements but also to impose fines 
for the competition law infringements. The Act also brought significant changes to the 
procedural rules which were closely modelled on Regulation 1/2003, such as the 
statement of objections with the intention to ensure the right of defence, the notion of 
professional privilege, the introduction of leniency, the criteria on calculating fines, and 
the possibility of commitments. Equally, the Act broadened the investigative powers of 
the CCA through empowering it to conduct dawn raids. Most recently, the 
Competition Law of 2013 expanded the competence of the Agency even further 
allowing it to directly enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is too early to assess its 
effectiveness in the enforcement of EU competition law, but it seems that the Croatian 
Competition Agency is now equipped to process case-handling and decision-making. 
(iii). Judicial review and its obstruction 
While the main emphasis of this article is on the NCAs and their capacity to enforce 
the EU competition provisions, admittedly, the decisions of the NCAs can be 
overturned by national courts. At the outset, the decision of NCAs of all the analysed 
Member States are subject to judicial review either to specialist courts (i.e. the 
Competition and Consumer Appeals Tribunal in Malta) or general administrative courts 
(i.e. Vilnius Administrative Court in Lithuania).147 On the one hand, judicial review 
serves as the ultimate control of the legality of the public authorities’ decisions. On the 
other hand, it can be an obstruction to the effective enforcement of competition law, 
especially in the new Member States due to judges’ unfamiliarity with the principles of 
competition law analysis. The Croatian Orthodontic Society (COS) case is illustrative; 
in 2013 the Agency initiated ex officio proceedings against COS and established that 
orthodontists had concluded a minimum-pricing agreement, adopted a price list under 
the name ‘Minimum prices for orthodontists’ services’, and published it on its website. 
The Agency fined the COS for the infringement of domestic equivalent of Article 101 
TFEU and declared the price list null and void. Yet, surprisingly, the Agency’s decision 
was overturned by the High Administrative Court on 20 April 2015. The Court held 
that the price list did not represent a prohibited agreement because it had never been 
applied in practice and had no obligatory effect on the COS’s members. Given that 
there is no ordinary avenue for appealing the Court’s ruling, the Agency had to resort 
to an extraordinary legal remedy – for the first time in its operation – by requesting the 
State Attorney’s Office for an extraordinary review of the legality of the ruling to be 
conducted by the Supreme Court.148  
This case in Croatia illustrates that effective enforcement of competition law can be in 
jeopardy, if there are only limited remedies available and judges lack a basic knowledge 
of competition law and are unfamiliar with the European Commission’s and European 
Courts’ interpretations. It is important that national law facilitates Article 15(3) 
Regulation 1/2003 for the coherent application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and 
                                                                                                                                         
147  For further discussion on judicial review in all Member States, see Pilot field study on the functioning of the national 
judicial systems for the application of competition law rules, Final Report DG Justice under Multiple Framework 
Contract JUST/2011/EVAL/01, 17 March 2014.  
148  The Supreme Court decision is pending. See, Liszt, n 16. 
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domestic equivalents. For instance, amicus curiae observations by the European 
Commission were submitted in several cases in Slovakia. In its intervention to the 
Supreme Court the European Commission shed some light with regard to the parallel 
application of Article 102 TFEU and its domestic equivalent and the NCA’s power to 
impose fines for an abuse of dominant position based on the general clause of the 
national provision equivalent to Article 102 TFEU.149 Along similar lines, the European 
Commission’s amicus curiae observations to the Slovak Supreme Court in the context of 
a case concerning the application of the concept of economic continuity and the 
effectiveness of fines in relation thereto pursuant to Article 102 TFEU, led to the 
original NCA decision being upheld in its entirety.150 
There are other more generic tools to secure the uniform application of EU 
competition law, such as the preliminary reference procedure pursuit to Article 267 
TFEU, which has been applied extensively in some Member States. For instance, the 
preliminary reference procedure has been employed in Slovakia in the banks cartel 
case,151 where the AMO in 2009 sanctioned three banks for the cartel with the aim to 
exclude a competitor, AKCENTA, from the market and to take over its clients. On 
appeal, the Regional Court annulled the AMO’s decision on the basis that AKCENTA 
ran a business in Slovakia without the licence required. On further appeal to the 
Supreme Court the questions were sent to the CJEU, which confirmed that that:  
“[a]rticle 101 TFEU must be interpreted in such meaning that the fact that an 
undertaking concerned by the cartel agreement, which object is the restriction of 
competition was allegedly operating illegally on the relevant market at the time 
when the agreement was concluded is of no relevance to the question whether the 
agreement constitutes an infringement of that provision”.152  
Accordingly, the decision of the Regional Court was annulled upholding the AMO’s 
decision.  
Therefore, it seems that various tools, such amicus curiae, a request for the European 
Commission’s opinion, or the preliminary reference procedure are of significant 
importance and should be more utilised in small ‘newer’ Member States to ensure the 
uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by national courts across all 
Member States alongside ongoing training for national judges. 
                                                                                                                                         
149  Case E.-P. v. Slovak NCA, 04/04/2012. After the European Commission’s observations, the Supreme Court 
overturned the first-instance review court's judgment and confirmed the original NCA infringement 
decision. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html (accessed 29 
October 2015). 
150  Case Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia, a.s, 2010. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html (accessed 29 October 2015). 
151  Slovenská sporiteľňa, a. s., Všeobecná úverová banka, a. s. and Československá obchodná banka, a. s, 
Decision No. 2009/KH/1/1/030 and decision No. 2009/KH/R/2/054. 
152  Case C-68/12 Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s. ECLI:EU:C:2013:71, at para 21. 
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The decentralised nature of Regulation 1/2003 means that all Member States are now 
faced with complex EU competition cases and have an obligation to enforce Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU once the effect on trade between the Member States criterion is 
met. Therefore, the article has presented a race track for small ‘newer’ Member States in 
their enforcement of EU competition law with some hurdles in their way. At the heart 
of the paper is an argument that ‘smallness’ does matter in the enforcement of EU 
competition law. First of all, ‘smallness’ in this article has been addressed in the context 
of the NCA’s limited resources due to their size and development level of their 
economies. Yet, they must have the same capacity in the context of basic equipment as 
in large Member States to be able to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as the same 
rules must be applied uniformly across the EU. To address their ‘smallness’ the 
analysed Member States have employed various tools, including prioritisation policies 
and the ability to refocus resources on the most severe anti-competitive cases and the 
creation of integrated multi-functional NCAs in some Member States, which embrace 
competition authorities and sectoral regulators. Secondly, in a very similar set of 
arguments lie further exposures of small countries to enforcement of EU competition 
rules due to their integrated national markets. Given openness to trade in all Member 
States, there are numerous industries where scale economies easily exceed the demand 
of a small country and many relevant markets overstep national borders. Thirdly, even 
if the practice may affect trade between Member States, the undertakings from small 
countries may struggle to prove the existence of an EU interest and therefore, the 
European Commission will not be prepared to release the NCA’s duty of its 
competence pursuant to Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003. This is because the European 
Commission is not obliged to verify whether the NCA concerned has the necessary 
institutional, financial and technical means to accomplish the task entrusted to it by the 
regulation. Finally, given that the NCAs are the primary public enforcers of the EU 
competition provisions153 and there is an expectation for a broad interpretation of the 
element of ‘effect on trade between Member States’, this criterion should be easily 
triggered in small Member States and therefore, in most cases Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU should be applied instead or simultaneously with domestic equivalents. 
Admittedly, recently introduced prioritisation policies will also place emphasis on the 
EU competition provisions leading towards the fading application of national law, 
especially in the context of Article 101 TFEU in small Member States.  
Building on further distinctions between ‘older’ and ‘newer’ small Member States 
stemming from the fact that the NCAs and national courts lack experience in the 
application and enforcement of competition law and still developing a culture of 
competition, the paper has further compared the statistical data on the number of EU 
competition cases investigated in these countries. Surprisingly, the ‘newer’ Member 
States are catching up with the ‘older’ Member States in their enforcement of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. Given that there were a few exceptions to this finding, the paper 
                                                                                                                                         
153  During a period of 1 May 2004 to 31 December 2012, the NCAs adopted 88% of all decisions on Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. See Ibid, Wils, fn. 2. 
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further elaborated on the potential obstacles that led to a lower number of cases in 
Croatia, Estonia, and Malta. While there is a burgeoning movement to criminalise cartel 
activity in several Member States of the EU, it seems that the small ‘newer’ Member 
States, such as Estonia154 and Malta are refocusing their competition enforcement 
towards decriminalisation. Estonia’s extensive focus on criminal offences, has 
potentially led to under-enforcement of EU competition enforcement; saying that, 
public competition enforcement via three different channels and complexity of 
different procedures has also contributed to this outcome. Further reforms have taken 
place in both jurisdictions to facilitate the enforcement of competition law. 
Interestingly, Estonia and Malta have the most integrated NCAs out of all analysed 
Member States with the sectoral regulatory functions (and consumer protection in case 
of Malta) as well as competition supervision merged in a single authority for better 
resource allocation.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that their multi-function 
authorities to blame for a lower number of EU cases in their jurisdictions. On the 
contrary, Estonia’s synergy work has been recently tested in several cases.155 While 
some ‘newer’ Member States, such as Estonia started applying the harshest sanctions 
from the beginning of its modern competition enforcement, others, such as Croatia 
opted for a soft start with symbolic fines being imposed. Even though the NCA of 
Croatia has taken several steps to improve its investigative as well as decision-making 
powers, yet its national laws should also facilitate amicus curiae and a better use of the 
preliminary reference procedure in order to avoid the NCA’s decisions being 
overturned by inexperienced national courts. The near future will display Croatia’s 
ability to effectively enforce EU competition law.  
It seems that all the NCAs of these small ‘newer’ Member States are constantly 
developing their policies to overcome hurdles for effective enforcement of competition 
law. These reforms are essential given that these countries are more exposed to 
complex EU competition cases. The finish line is not quite reached, nevertheless, there 
are developments taking place towards that direction.  
                                                                                                                                         
154  Criminal offence still applies to restrictive agreements in Estonia. 
155  Such as AS Tallinna Küte. See ECA, Annual Report of Estonia, 2014. 
